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Abstract
Using multiple births as an Instrumental Variable (IV) for family size and data for 43 developing 
countries, I fi nd evidence that a shock in fertility has a cost for a family as a whole. Mothers 
are more likely to live under less stable family arrangements and they are more likely to use 
contraceptives. Children are less likely to receive some vaccines, attend school, live their 
mother and there is an increase in odds of mortality. The analysis by level of development 
reveals the cost of fertility comes from those countries with lower level of development.
Keywords: Fertility, Health, Education, Family Arrangements, Developing Countries.
JEL classifi cation: J11, J12, J13, J18, O15.
Resumen
Utilizando  nacimientos múltiples como variable instrumental (IV) para el tamaño de la familia 
y datos para 43 países en vías de desarrollo, se encuentra evidencia de que un incremento 
en el número de niños tiene un costo para toda familia en su conjunto. Las madres son 
más propensas a vivir en estructuras familiares menos estables, como también, a usar 
anticonceptivos. Los niños en dichas familias son menos propensos a recibir algunas 
vacunas, a asistir a la escuela, vivir con sus madres y para alguna de las muestras, se 
observa un aumento en la mortalidad infantil. El análisis por nivel de desarrollo revela que el 
costo de la fertilidad proviene de aquellos países con menores niveles de desarrollo.
Palabras claves: Fertilidad, Salud, Educación, Estructura Familiar, Países en vías de 
Desarrollo.
Códigos JEL: J11, J12, J13, J18, O15.
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1 Introduction 
In this paper by using a sample of 43 developing countries I study the impact of fertility not 
only on children but also on the complete family.  Indeed, an integral understanding of the 
impact of fertility on the complete household as well as the knowledge of degree of freedom 
of families to allocated resources is required when trying to understand the recent findings 
which cast doubt on the impact of family size on children wellbeing. 
Although Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) support a negative impact of number of 
births on child’s education for India, thirty years later, new evidence is less supportive of a 
tradeoff between family size and child quality as proposed by Becker’s Quantity & Quality 
model [Becker and Lewis (1973); and Becker and Tomes (1976)]. Specifically, Black, 
Devereux and Salvanes (2005), using multiple births as a source of variation in family size and 
administrative data for Norway, find no impact of number of siblings on educational 
attainments. Angrist, Lavy and Schlosser (2010), also using multiple births (for some of the 
samples) as a source of variation in family size and census data matched with administrative 
data for Israel, do not find evidence of a quantity-quality trade-off across samples.  
Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser (2010) suggest four factors explaining this “absence 
of causal link” between fertility and long-term outcomes. First, parents might make use of 
perfect capital markets to support child investment independently of current resource 
constraints. Second, parents facing a shift in family size adjust “on margins other than quality 
inputs” or “marginally irrelevant inputs.” That is, parents who experience an increase in the 
number of children over a desired quantity will first reduce investment in those inputs 
with lower return on final child wellbeing and therefore minimize the final impact on children. 
Third, welfare and public spending help families that are exposed to an unexpected increase 
in family size. Finally, it might be the case that there are gains in family size due to social 
interaction. 
Empirically, and consistent with these hypotheses, Caceres-Delpiano (2006) and 
Conley and Glauber (2006), estimate a negative and significant impact of number of children 
on the probability of attending a private school for the United States. Caceres-Delpiano (2004) 
finds a positive impact on the probability that a child would share the bedroom for the US 
as well. Both school type and sharing bedroom are probably investment margins with a 
lower return on child wellbeing than completed years of education, for example. In fact, 
Cáceres-Delpiano (2006) does not find an impact on the probability of repeating a grade 
or years of education, which are margins closer to final wellbeing. Finally, consistent with 
the idea of public funds helping individuals stressed because of a shock in fertility, 
Cáceres-Delpiano and Simonsen (2010) find that, for the United States, an increase in family 
size increases the likelihood of welfare participation and the use of Medicaid. 
Moreover, implicitly in the previous hypotheses is the active role of other household 
members (parents) to buffer an expected change in fertility. Empirically, nevertheless, 
the impact of family size on other members of the household has focused primarily on its 
impact on mothers’ labor force participation. To the best of my knowledge, Cáceres-Delpiano 
and Simonsen (2010) is one of the few studies focusing on other dimensions and other 
household members. Specifically, Cáceres-Delpiano and Simonsen (2010), using US census 
data and the National Health Interview Survey, investigate the effect of family size on a variety 
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of measures of well-being and demonstrate that additional children increases the likelihood of 
mothers suffering from high blood pressure as well as increasing the propensity to smoke and 
the risk of obesity, among other outcomes. 
Therefore, this paper advances the literature in three important ways. First, using 
Demographic Health Survey (DHS) data for 43 developing countries and the event of multiple 
births at different parities as a source of variation in family size, I provide evidence of the 
impact of family size not only on child outcomes but also among other members in 
the household. Second, by using data from developing countries, I am able to study a sample 
of families for whom family planning policies should have a higher return1 since these families 
have fewer margins out of child investment;2 they are more likely to face an incomplete capital 
market, and; lack the support of welfare institutions. All these factors not only increase the 
likelihood that a shock in family size reaches child´s wellbeing but also the likelihood that other 
household members are affected. In fact, a hypothesis based on fewer degrees of freedom in 
developing countries when facing a shock in fertility is consistent with earlier evidence for 
India supporting a trade-off [Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980)] versus the latest evidence using 
data for developed countries such as Israel [Angrist, Lavy and Schlosser (2010)], Norway 
[Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005)] or the US [Cáceres-Delpiano (2006)]. Finally, exploiting 
disparity in levels of development among the countries in the sample, I provide evidence 
about the heterogeneity in the impact of fertility across different levels of development. Thus, 
by focusing the analysis on less developed countries, first, I am able to not only to study a 
sample of families for whom family planning policies should have the higher return but also 
families with fewer margins out of child investment. Specifically, I study the impact of fertility 
on family arrangements, acceptance of violence, and contraceptive behavior.3 Finally, I look at 
the effect of number of children on children outcomes measured by children’s vaccinations, 
years of education, grade retention, the likelihood of attending school, mortality and the 
probability of living in the same household than their mother.   
The results of the investigation reveal that there is a positive return of caring for family 
size in the context of developing countries. Using multiple births as an Instrumental Variable 
(IV) for family size, I find evidence that a shock in fertility has a cost for a family as a whole. 
First, we observe that an increase in family size is associated with an increase in the 
incidence of unstable family arrangements, measured by an increase in the likelihood that a 
mother holding a non-traditional role (being the head of the household or not the spouse 
of the household head), decreases the likelihood of being married and decreases the 
likelihood that the mother’s spouse (partner) lives in the same household. For outcomes 
                                                                          
1. This suggested higher return in developing countries goes beyond an increase in child investment. At the macro 
level, a reduction in fertility in a context of fixed capital and a decreasing return in labor will increase labor productivity. 
Also, a transition to regimes with lower fertility and lower mortality implies a demographic change with a higher 
proportion of the population in ages with higher saving rates (Schultz, 2007). 
2. In developing countries, families have lower levels of income (wealth), so the marginal utility of income is high and 
families work long hours for low wages. Since the marginal utility of wealth is high in developing countries, parents 
are not “able” to cut back on work to raise children, at least in earlier parities, so children get little time and, relative to 
smaller families, get less market derived goods. For example, families just above starvation will have both parents 
working full-time. As such, a new child is essentially a negative wealth shock so the marginal utility of wealth must rise. 
However, since families cannot work more, they can only consume less; that is, “feed” each person less. This will not 
only lower child “quality” but the amount of resources allocated to other members in the household. In a developed 
country, parents have some leisure. If leisure and childrearing are close substitutes, then an extra child might 
lead parents to substitute out of leisure into childrearing. In case time and goods are substitutes in child production they 
might substitute out of child rearing goods, which to some extent might mitigate the effects on adult consumption and 
perhaps on adult labor.  
3. The use of contraceptives not only captures the impact on forgone utility in adults but also constitutes a first line 
investment to prevent the spread of a shock in family size on other children, not only by reducing the chance of an 
additional child but also reducing the uncertainty of family size. 
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directly associated to mothers’ wellbeing, I first find that an upward shift in the number of 
children increases the likelihood of accepting violence for some of the samples. Second, for 
the variables characterizing contraceptive behavior, I find that an increase in fertility raises the 
time between intercourses and increases the use of contraceptives, sterilization among them. 
For children’s outcomes, the findings reveal that more children in a family decrease the 
likelihood of a completed vaccination schedule, increase the odds of child mortality, reduce 
the probability of attending school and we observe a reduction in the likelihood of living in the 
same household than their mother. The analysis by level of development of the countries 
reveals an important degree of heterogeneity. While the impact on outcomes measuring 
family arrangements and children wellbeing is driven for countries with a lower level of 
income, the impact on a mother’s acceptance of violence comes from those countries in the 
middle part of the distribution. Finally, the impact on contraceptive behavior shows a different 
type of heterogeneity. At all levels of development, mothers change their contraceptive 
behavior. Nevertheless, at higher levels of development, the use of contraceptive alternatives 
such as sterilization is preferred, while in regions with a lower level of development, the 
alternatives used are spacing of intercourse, abstinence and withdrawal. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the empirical specification and 
identification strategy are presented. Section 3 details the data used in the analysis, the 
criteria applied to the construction of samples and outcomes in the investigation. In Section 4 
the results are presented and Section 5 concludes. 
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2 Empirical Methodology and Identification 
The following expression corresponds to the specification of interest in the analysis, 
ݕ௜௖௧
௦ ൌ ߩ௧௖௦ ൅ ߨ௔௦ ൅ ߠ௘௦ ൅ ߜ௎௦ ൅ ߛ௦݊௜௖௧
௦ ൅ ߝ௜௖௧ǡ
௦   (E1) 
where ݕ௜௖௧
௦  represents an specific outcome for a mother or child ݅, who lives in country ܿ, 
at year ݐ, and belongs to a sample ݏ4;  ݊௜௖௧௦  represents family size and; the terms ߨ௔௦ , ߠ௘௦ and 
ߜ௎௦  are fixed effects by age, educations and urban status of the mother, respectively. Finally, 
the term ߜ௎௦  is a fixed effect for year and country.5 
The impact of family size on mother’s or children’s outcomes is measured by ɀୱ. As a 
profuse literature has documented, OLS estimates of equation (E1) may be subject to an 
omitted variable bias since the ሺ୧ǡ ɂ୧ሻ is not zero6 (Shultz, 2007). Therefore, statistical 
inference based on OLS will provide an inconsistent estimate of ɀୱ. In order to address this 
omitted variable bias and how it has been done in previous studies (Black, Devereux and 
Salvanes, 2005; Caceres-Delpiano, 2006; Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser, 2010 and; Caceres-
Delpiano and Simonsen, 2011), I use multiple births as a source of variation in family size.  
Specifically, I define ୗas the binary instrument, multiple births, that takes a value equal to 
one for a family (mother) with a multiple birth in the s birth and zero otherwise. Specifically, in 
the analysis three sub-samples are defined according to the value of s. The first sub-sample 
consists of mothers with one or more births (1+) whose instrument is ͳ, the second one, 
families with two or more children (2+) whose instrument is ʹ, and finally, mothers with 
three or more births (3+) whose instrument is ͵. 
                                                                          
4. The economic foundation for equation (E1) can be contextualized using the notation from the treatment literature. 
The population of interest, ݏ, is represented by a family with an endowment of ݏ births at a specific moment ݐ. For this 
sample of families we are interested in the treatment, ݊௦, which for the sake of simplicity in the exposition, is defined as a 
dummy variable taking the value of one in case a mother goes for an additional child (birth) over ݏ, and zero otherwise. 
Given this treatment, we can define two counterfactuals for an specific outcome; ଴ܻ as the outcome for a woman who 
does not receive the treatment, that is, in case she decides for a family size of ݏ (݊௦ ൌ Ͳ) and; ଵܻ as the outcome for an 
individual who receives the treatment, or in other words, decides for a family size bigger than ݏ (݊௦ ൌ ͳ). Then for each 
individual we can define ( ଵܻ െ ଴ܻ) as the treatment effect associated with an increase in family size beyond ݏ. This 
treatment can vary among families with different values for a set covariates, ܺ. Specifically, each of these counterfactuals 
can be expressed as, ௩ܻ ൌ ߤ௩ሺܺሻ ൅ ܷ௩ with ݒ ൌ Ͳǡͳ. Then, it may be the case that controlling for ܺ the treatment 
effect, ( ଵܻ െ ଴ܻ), is the same for all families (homogeneous treatment effect given ܺ). Nevertheless, more realistic 
mothers (children) vary in their response to the increase in family size even after controlling for the observed covariates 
and the impact of family size cannot any longer be summarized by a scalar but for a distribution. Often economists focus 
on some mean of the distribution of ( ଵܻ െ ଴ܻ) and use a regression framework to interpret the data [Heckman, Urzua 
and Vytlacil (2006)]. Specifically, using switching regression framework we can represent the observed outcome 
according to the following regression model, ܻ௦ ൌ ݊௦ ଵܻ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݊௦ሻ ଴ܻ ൌ ߙ௦ ൅ ߛ௦݊௦ ൅ ߝ௦ , ߙ௦ ൌ ߤ଴, ߛ௦ ൌ ଵܻ െ
଴ܻ ൌ ߤଵ െ ߤ଴ ൅ ଵܷ െ ܷ଴, ߝ௦ ൌ ܷ଴, and for the sake of simplicity in the exposition other covariates, ܺ, are left implicit. 
In this framework, the impact of family size on mother’s (child’s) outcomes is measured by ߛ௦. 
5. Introducing fixed effects at year-country level is identical to allow fixed effects at survey level. There has been 
a continuous update in the survey design and fixed effects at the survey level control for these updates.  
6. Fertility and family resource allocation are determined jointly and simultaneously within a lifetime household decision-
making framework; thus we expect that unobserved economic constraints on the family and parent’s preferences will 
impact on fertility decisions and other lifetime household behaviors. Specifically, in the empirical literature studying the 
impact of fertility (on children, mother’s labor force participation and family structure) special stress has been given to an 
abstract concept of “ability” or, in a model like Browm and Flinn (2006, 2010), to the variable measuring “marriage 
value.” Although it seems that there is some agreement about some of these factors behind the endogeneity of number 
of children, defining the sign of the bias associated to this omitted variable problem, is a much harder task. Specifically, 
this bias will depend on the model that the researcher has in mind and therefore the potential unobserved factors that 
are correlated with fertility and the selected outcomes.  
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Whether or not the occurrence of multiple births is an appropriate instrument 
depends on the legitimacy of two well-known assumptions. First, the correlation between 
multiple births and family size is different from zero. This assumption implies that there should 
be enough correlation between multiple births and family size, so an average difference in 
family size exists and can be measured properly. Women who experience a multiple birth 
have some ability to adjust their subsequent fertility. For example, a mother that would like 
four children may simply quit having children if on her third birth she delivers twins. This is 
particularly problematic when working with developing countries, given the higher observed 
fertility. Nevertheless, heterogeneity in the ideal number of children ensures that at least for 
some individuals, multiple births produce a shift in family size even at lower margins of family 
size. I show in the following section that multiple births, in fact, shift mother’s number of 
children upward for all subsamples.  
The second assumption, non-testable, is no correlation between the instrument and 
the error term in the regression. This assumption implies that there should not be a correlation 
between multiple births and the error term, so that any impact that is observed over the 
variable of interest should be necessarily attributed to a change in family size. There are two 
types of twins, the most common of the multiple pregnancies: identical (monozygotic) and 
fraternal (non-identical, dizygotic). Identical twins occur when a single embryo divides into two 
embryos. Identical twins have the same genetic makeup and their incidence is equal in all age 
groups and countries (3.5 per 1000 births). Fraternal twins occur when two separate eggs are 
fertilized by separate sperms. The occurrence of fraternal twins, unlike identical twins, varies 
and there are several risk factors that may contribute to increase their incidence7. In the 
existent literature, there are two concerns when using multiple births as instrument for fertility. 
First, multiple births have a higher incidence among mothers undergoing fertility treatments 
and among women who come from families with previous incidence of fraternal twins. 
Nevertheless, given the sample under analysis (developing countries), the average age of the 
first child and the cost associated with fertility treatments, the use of fertility drugs should not 
be a concern in my analysis8. Also, there is no priori information that women are acting 
differently based on this hereditary information or that hereditary factors are associated with a 
particular group of the population.  
A second concern raised by Rosenzweig and Zhang (2006) when studying the 
impact of fertility on child investment refers to the possibility that parents might allocate 
resources to compensate for (reinforce) an endowment shock. In fact, among twins and 
higher-order multiple birth children, for example, triplets and quadruplets, rates of low birth 
weight and infant mortality are 4 to 33 times higher compared to singleton births. Moreover, 
twins and other higher-order multiple births are more likely to suffer life-long disabilities if they 
survive (National Vital Statistics Report, 1999). Thus, mothers (parents) might on the one hand 
react by reallocating resources between household members to compensate for a shock in 
                                                                          
7. For the US according to the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, first, the incidence is higher among the 
Afro-American population. Second, non-identical twin women give birth to twins at a rate of 1 set per 60 births, which is 
higher than the rate of 1 of every 90 births, at the national level. Fourth, women between 35 to 40 years of age with four 
or more children are three times more likely to have twins than a woman under 20 without children. Finally, multiple 
births are more common among women who utilize fertility medication (Martin and Park 1999). 
8. Using US Census data for the year 1980 and data from the National Health Interview Survey for the period 1982-
1989 (also for the US), I construct the share of children who were twin births by year of births. That fraction is plotted in 
Figure 1. The share of twins is stable for the period under analysis (with a little more dispersion for the NHIS data due the 
smaller sample size). Moreover, this proportion of twin births before the penetration of fertility drugs during the early 90’s 
is approximately 1.7% to 1.9% which is practically the same as we found in this current analysis with around 2% of twin 
births (see, Table 2). Additionally, this proportion is quite close to numbers reported by the US National Vital Statistical 
Service (NVSS) showing a 1.95% and 1.86% of twin births for the periods 1962-1968 and 1971-1979, respectively. 
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endowment. This endowment canal would invalidate the exclusion restriction due to an 
impact of multiple births beyond the channel of fertility. Following Rosenzweig and Zhang 
(2006), I check the robustness of the findings by controlling for birth weight as measure of 
child endowment in the regression analysis for children outcomes9. Additionally, for mother’s 
outcomes I use auxiliary data constructed from census data for three developing countries to 
check the robustness of the impact of fertility on different outcomes (the results and 
discussion are presented in the appendix). Specifically, I use disability status as a proxy for 
child endowment and I check the sensitivity of the estimates to the inclusion of this variable. 
The results for these two analyses prove the robustness of the results and they are reported 
in the appendix. 
Moreover, and for the reasons already explained, we expect that children belonging 
to multiple births were different of the rest of the population. To address this concern, 
specifically in the analysis of children’s outcomes, I keep all children from births prior to the ݏ 
pregnancy as a unit of observation10. That is, for the sample of families with two or more 
children (2+)11, I restrict the analysis to the oldest child in the family. Then for samples 3+, the 
unit of observation will be the two oldest siblings in the family.  These children are all from 
families that planned on having a second (third) child, but may not have banked on having a 
third (fourth) one. More importantly, by focusing our attention on the older children, I examine 
children affected by multiple births through family size rather than through other factors 
directly related to being part of a multiple birth. Specifically, the observational unit in equation 
(1) when I analyze the impact on children’s outcomes will be the older children (siblings) in the 
household that do not belong to a multiple birth and he (they) has (have) at least one 
additional sibling at birth ݏ. Nevertheless, when the outcomes are at the family or an adult 
(mothers) level, I keep one observation per family (mother).  
Therefore, despite the fact that the second assumption is non-testable, the random 
nature of multiple births, the choice of the observational unit under analysis (oldest child in the 
household that does not belong to a multiple birth when I study the impact on children), the 
inclusion of other variables that are correlated with the incidence of multiple births such as 
age of the mother or the mother’s education and the analysis of the impact of twinning in a 
specific birth, s; make it more likely that this assumption holds. 
The impact of family size as presented in equation (E1), is constant across 
observations, although this assumption may be unrealistic given the obvious heterogeneity in 
household’s preference, production technology and constraints12. Extensive literature on 
program evaluation has mentioned the importance of addressing this heterogeneity in the 
                                                                          
9. Rosenzweig and Zhang use child’s birth weight as a proxy of child endowment. DHS data have information on birth 
weight only for some of the children (younger than five) in the household and only for some of the country-year samples. 
This limitation in the sample and the high requirements of data (sample size) faced when using multiple births as source 
of variation, make this alternative really costly in term of power. Restricting the sample to children younger than five, I get 
approximately 50% of the sample with missing information about birth weight. Moreover, the lack of information is 
negatively correlated with mother’s education, urban status and level of development of the country. Instead of just 
restricting the sample to those having information about birth weight, I consider a interaction of birth weight and a 
dummy variable that reflects if the information on birth weight is missing or not. 
10. When estimating equation (E1) for children’s outcome, I introduce child’s age and gender dummies. Moreover, for 
the sample of families with three or more births (sample 3+), dummy variables for birth order is also introduced in the 
specification. Because for sample 2+ I restrict the sample just to the oldest child in the family, we do not need a dummy 
for birth order. 
11. For the same reasons, the analysis for children cannot be done for the sample 1+. The variation in family size due to 
multiple births happens in the first birth. Therefore, we do not have children born prior to the event of multiple births. 
12. The use of the concept of heterogeneity as synonymous with selection is often observed in the empirical literature. 
Here we make reference to the fact that the parameter ߛ௦ cannot be summarized by scalar rather with a complete 
distribution (Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil, 2006).   
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impact of a specific “treatment”. Heckman (1997) calls attention to the role of the 
heterogeneity and the sensitivity of IV to assumptions about how individuals internalize this 
heterogeneity in their decisions of being part of the treated group (i.e. the selection of family 
size). Imbens and Angrist (1994) have shown that IV estimates can be interpreted as a “Local 
Average Treatment Effects” (LATE) in a setting with heterogeneity in the impacts and 
individuals whose actions take this heterogeneity into account13. In this case, IV identifies the 
impact of an increase in family size for those families that have had more children than they 
otherwise would have, due to multiple births. Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser (2010) show that in 
the specific case of using the event of multiple births as an instrument, and due to its the 
perfect compliance14, the LATE can be interpreted as an Average Treatment Effect on the 
Non-Treated. That is, the population of compliers is composed by all the mothers who 
wanted to stay at a specific family size, ݏ, as the ideal number of children,  who  nevertheless, 
as a product of multiple births were pushed to  a bigger family size, that is the “Non-Treated” 
at ݏ. Therefore, the instrument identifies an increase in family size for families who sought an 
̶ݏ̶ pregnancy (child) but received one (twins) or more (triplets, quadruplets, etc.) additional 
children. In fact, this is the population of individuals that higher values of “ݏ” policy makers 
have in mind when defining the benefits of family program initiatives. 
Although all the countries in our sample can be defined as underdeveloped, we have 
a great level of heterogeneity among them in terms of development. Moreover as I mentioned 
in the introduction, there are reasons to expect some level of heterogeneity in the impact of 
fertility. In fact, the empirical evidence casting doubt about the negative impact of fertility on 
children’s long-term wellbeing is restricted to developed countries such as Israel (Angrist, 
Lavy, and Schlosser, 2010), or Norway (Black, Devereux and Salvanes, 2005). Thus, by 
focusing the analysis on less developed countries, first, I am able to not only study a sample 
of families for whom family planning policies should have the higher return but also families 
with fewer margins out of child investment. To study the heterogeneity by level of 
development, I estimate (E1) for different levels of development. Specifically the World Bank 
Country Classification (WBCC) for the year 2009 is used to define these levels of 
development15. Table1 reports the classification of each country according the WBCC16. 
Using this classification, countries in the sample are defined as “Low Income” (23), “Lower 
Middle Income” (13) and “Upper Middle Income” (7) without one falling into the category of 
“High Income.” 
                                                                          
13. When ߛ௦ is homogenous, multiple births being a valid instrument (as well as any other valid instrument) will allow us 
to identify all the relevant parameters such as the ATE, ATT or ATUT since they all are the same (Heckman, Urzua and 
Vytlacil, 2006). Nevertheless, with ߛ௦ being heterogeneous and individuals sorting in the gains of family size, the 
interpretation of the parameter estimated with multiple births (or other instruments) is less straight forward. 
14. The average treatment effect on the untreated can be expressed as a weighted average of the average treatment on 
“Never-takers” and the average treatment on “Compliers” (see Angrist and Pischke (2009) for details). The terms of 
“never-takers” and “compliers” come from the analogy with randomized trials where some experimental subjects comply 
with the randomly assigned treatment but some do not. Those who do not get “treatment” when randomly assigned to 
do so are those defined as never-takers. Nevertheless in the specific case of multiple births, mothers (families) who 
wanted to stay at a specific family size but face a multiple births in that “ݏ” birth cannot avoid being pushed (treated) to a 
family size bigger than ݏ. Therefore, there are not “never-takers” when using multiple births as a source of variation of 
family size. 
15. Economies are classified according the 2009 GNI per capita. The groups are “low income,” $995 or less; “lower 
middle income,” $996-$3,945; “upper middle income,” $3,946-$12,195 and; “high income,” $12,196 or more.  
16.  In a previous version of the paper countries were classified by Human Development Index (HDI) or country region 
and similar results were obtained. 
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3 Data 
The primary data source in the analysis is the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS)17. 
These surveys are nationally-representative household surveys that provide data for a wide 
range of monitoring and impact evaluation indicators in the areas of population, health and 
nutrition. The sample in each country-year is typically a stratified random sample of all non-
institutional households18. The universe of the survey is mothers who are 15 to 49 years old at 
the time of the interview. The analysis is restricted to 43 developing countries for which there 
is an average of two sample years (Table 1). The criterion for selecting these countries and 
years is based on getting a large enough sample size and ensuring that the key information 
for constructing the sample and variables were available and consistently measured. 
The sample is restricted to those mothers who are between 18 and 45 years old, 
and who had their first birth between 15 and 35 years of age. By doing so, I focus on women 
who are in the middle of their childbearing years and who started their reproductive lives 
neither too early (before 15 years of age) nor extremely late (after 35 years of age). I also 
restrict the sample to those mothers whose oldest child is under 17 years of age.  
The mother’s measure of fertility, ݊௜௖௧
௦ , is number of surviving children.19 This 
definition of fertility differs from the total number of children living with their parents. In fact, the 
decision that children live in the same household or turning them over to relatives (or any 
other third party) can be seen as an outcome of family size which I explore when I analyze the 
impact on children outcomes.  
Following Bronars and Grogger (1994) and Angrist and Evans (1998), multiple births 
can be identified here by not only exploiting the fact that DHS data reports the year and 
month of birth for each of the children a woman had but also using the direct information 
provided in the DHS data on whether a child belongs or not to a multiple birth. Then, in the 
case of two or more children in the household who belong to a multiple birth, they have the 
same age, the same month of birth and the same mother, they are defined to be twins (or 
multiple births). Since multiple births are rare, a large sample is needed in order to have 
sufficient statistical power; this is provided by combining the different DHS cross sections. 
Using the algorithm outlined above, I classify 2.05 percent of these children as multiple births, 
2.02 percent of which are twins (Table 2). 
Three groups of outcomes are included in the analysis: household structure; violence 
rationalization, mothers’ contraceptive behavior, and children’s outcomes. While the first 
group of variables intends to capture the impact on the organization of the household, the 
second and third groups of variables tries to measure a direct impact on mothers’ wellbeing 
and the fourth group of variables the impact on a traditional measure of child’s outcomes. 
                                                                          
17. Source: ICF Macro, 2009. MEASURE DHS  http://www.measuredhs.com. 
18. Giving this sample design, all regressions in the present analysis incorporate sample weights. 
19. In a previous version, children ever born was used as measure of fertility with similar qualitatively results. In this 
version I choose number of surviving children over children ever born to keep comparability with previous studies such 
as Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser (2010) or Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005). These two studies by using matched 
administrative data construct fertility based on existing records; therefore the measure of fertility is closer to number of 
surviving children. I also tried a measure of fertility adjusted by child spacing, and in general, the estimates for all 
regressions tend to be bigger.    
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The impact of number of children on family structure is formalized by Brown and 
Flinn (2006) who demonstrate the simultaneous interaction between child quality and the 
decision of divorce in a model of the family dynamics. Parents receive utility from child quality; 
as a result, exogenous increases in child quality, makes divorce more costly. Simultaneously, 
a reduction in the likelihood of getting divorced motivates a higher investment in child quality. 
Specifically, to analyze the impact in the household structure in our sample of developing 
countries, I use four variables to describe household arrangements. The first one, “Married,” is 
a dummy variable taking a value one if a mother reports being married and zero otherwise.  
Although this measure is informative for western societies, the importance of this institution 
and its acknowledgement across societies is not the same.  In order to have a broader 
definition, I construct the dummy variable, “Living with someone,” which takes a value of one 
if a mother cohabitates and zero otherwise. Although the previous two variables are useful to 
know whether mothers report a spouse or partner, these measures could overestimate a 
“stable” family arrangement if there is some stigma associated with the end of a union. The 
following two variables attempt to overcome this problem. A third dummy variable, “Spouse 
at home,” takes a value of one if the spouse is physically at home and zero otherwise. Finally, 
using information about the relationship with the household head, I define the dummy 
variable, “Non Traditional Role,” which takes the value one if a mother is not the spouse of the 
head of household and zero otherwise. This last variable allows us to capture, first, the impact 
of fertility on female household headship, which has been associated with higher poverty 
rates, and also to measure the impact on family arrangements that enable transfer among 
family members away from the primary family unit. 
Two types of variables are used to capture a direct impact of fertility on mothers. 
First, I use mother’s acceptance of violence to mediate conflicts20 as a measure of female 
wellbeing21. DHS data collect information about five dimensions which might motivate 
violence against mothers such as burning the food, neglecting children, going out without her 
husband’s (partner’s) approval, arguing with her spouse (partner), and refusing sex. I 
summarize these five dimensions in four dummy variables: “Any Reason” takes a value of one 
if, for whichever of the situation listed above, the use of violence is justified by a mother, and 
zero otherwise;  “Household Neglect,” takes a value of one if the respondent accepts violence 
if she would have neglected the children or she would have burned the food, and zero 
otherwise; “Husband Mistreatment” takes a value of one if she would have argued with her 
husband or she would have gone out without his approval, and zero otherwise, and finally; 
“Refuse sex” takes a value of one in case she justifies the use of violence when refusing sex, 
and zero otherwise. 
Additionally, in this second group of variables which measure a direct impact on 
mothers, there are the ones characterizing contraceptive behavior. In fact, number of children, 
rather than being a deterministic variable fully controlled by parents, cannot be set with 
                                                                          
20. A better measure of mother’s wellbeing is probably the actual use of domestic violence. Nevertheless, few country-
year samples in the DHS data provide this information.  Additionally, actual domestic violence is subject to different 
measurement problems. First, domestic violence is specific to a family arrangement which can be simultaneously 
affected by fertility decisions. Second, mothers might hide the actual use of violence in the household. Therefore, I use 
the acceptance of the use of violence as second best since it does not require a partner/husband presence at home and 
it is less likely that this information would not be revealed. 
21. A well documented relationship in the literature is the negative impact of fertility on mothers’ labor attachment either 
in developed countries (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980b; Bronars and Grogger, 1994; Jacobsen, Pearce, and 
Rosenbloom, 1999; Angrist and Evans, 1998; Hotz, McElroy, and Sanders, 2005) or developing countries (Caceres-
Delpiano, 2010). Once women leave the labor market, they accumulate less training and market experience (Schultz, 
2007). An increase in fertility will then reduce mothers’ outside marriage value, which might reduce not only her 
bargaining power in the household but also make her more likely to suffer from domestic violence (Stevenson and 
Wolfers, 2006). 
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absolute certainty. Individuals control the probability of conception to some degree, with total 
fertility being a random variable. Michael and Willis (1973) develop a model with these 
characteristics22. By using Michael and Willis’ notation, the probability of conception in a 
specific moment can be represented as ݌௜ ൌ ߚܿ௜ሺͳ െ ݁௜
௝ሻ , with ߚ the “intrinsic fecundity,” 
which is defined as the probability of conception from a single unprotected act of coition at a 
random point during the menstrual cycle, ܿ௜ the frequency of coition during the cycle, and ݁௜
௝ 
the reduction in probability of conception associated with the ݆ contraceptive alternative.  This 
expression points out the three channels through which individuals can alter their probability 
of conception: frequency of coition, use of contraceptives and the type of contraceptive used. 
Although the survey does not provide direct information about frequency of coition, mothers 
are asked about the number of days since the last intercourse. I use this variable as an 
inverse proxy of coition frequency. The second variable I define is a dummy variable, “Ever 
Use Contraceptive,” which takes a value of one if the mother reports that she had used some 
contraceptive alternative and zero otherwise. Additionally, from the survey we can pin down in 
specific some of the contraceptive alternatives. In particular, I define the dummy variable 
“Sterilization,” that takes a value of one if a mother has been sterilized and zero otherwise and 
the dummy variable “Abstinence/Withdrawal” taking a value one in case abstinence or 
withdrawal are used as a contraceptive options, and zero otherwise.  
In a model like Michael and Willis’s, a shift in fertility is predicted to produce an 
increase in the expected mean and therefore an increase in the dispersion of the expected 
fertility. This rise in the uncertainty in the expected fertility will increase the return associated 
with the use of contraceptives as a mechanism for reducing the uncertainty. For any ex-ante 
desired fertility, then, parents will be more likely to use contraceptives as a product of 
unexpected shock in fertility. Second, parents will be more likely to change to contraceptive 
alternatives with a lower marginal23 cost (such as sterilization), everything else being constant, 
because more potential births will need to be prevented. 
The final group of variables in my analysis is the one directly linked to children.  
In specific, for children outcomes I define three types: health, educational and family 
arrangement outcomes. First for health variables, I define four health dummies reflecting 
children’s vaccination. DHS Birth Record data provide information about vaccination  
records for children younger than five years old. In particular I have information about 
                                                                          
22. They set the problem in two steps. First, families select the distribution of family size that maximizes individuals’ life 
utility, and in a second step, individuals select the contraception alternative that allows them to reach the desired 
conception probability at the lowest cost. An essential feature of the process is that the mean and dispersion of children 
are jointly determined by the choice of conception probability. Moreover, in Michael and Willis’s model, for the nature of 
the process, mean fertility and its dispersion are positively correlated for low values of fertility. “Thus the greater the 
expected fertility, the greater is the uncertainty about the actual fertility, or greater is the expected deviation between the 
mean and actual fertility.” Families then care not only about the average number of children but also its dispersion. This 
dispersion can be considered a risk factor which can also affect child quality. 
23. In Michael and Willis’s model, parents’ benefit from the use of a contraceptive choice comes by reaching an 
“optimal” fertility in the sense that maximizes expected utility and because parents are able to reduce the uncertainty in 
the expected fertility, since  the “optimal” fertility is below the “desired fertility” in a context of perfect and costless fertility 
control.  Regarding the cost size, parents face not only money and time cost, but also forgo pleasure, health and cultural 
or religious principles when they select a specific contraceptive alternative (Michael and Willis, 1973). Then, parents in 
order to maximize their expected utility, parents select a specific mean fertility and the contraceptive alternative with the 
lowest associated cost that allows them to reach that expected fertility. Since contraceptive options differ in their 
marginal and fixed cost, those options with a relatively low marginal cost (in relation to the fixed cost) will be the ones 
preferred for those parents who want to reach a lower expected fertility, or in other words, avoid a greater number of 
potential births. The distinction between fixed and variable (marginal) costs in the model is based on the fact that the first 
one is not related to the degree of use of a specific contraceptive choice. While the cost of information about a specific 
contraceptive alternative fit as a fixed cost in the model, cultural or religious pressure when using a specific contraceptive 
or the forgone pleasure can be seen as a variable cost.  
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Measles24, Poliomyelitis25 (Polio), DPT (Diphtheria, Pertussis and Tetanus) and BCG (Bacillus 
Calmette-Guérin). Given the differences in the nature of these vaccines, the vaccination 
process can take more than one dose (Polio and DPT).  Considering this information for each 
of these vaccines, I define a dummy variable to take a value of one if some doses have not 
been administered26, and zero otherwise. Given the age restriction in the availability of vaccine 
information (children younger than five years old) and the restriction to the oldest siblings in 
the family, I restrict the analysis to the sample 2+ for the variable about vaccine27. Also in this 
group of health outcomes I define for children younger than seven a dummy variable, “death”, 
that takes a value one when a mother reports that child is dead at the time of the survey, and 
zero otherwise. For educational outcomes, three variables are defined. First, “attend school” 
which is a dummy variable taking a value one in case a child is reported going to school, and 
zero otherwise; years of education and; finally a dummy variable that I define as “grade 
retention” that takes a value one when a child has a reported number of years of education 
lower than the mode observed in that specific country and age group. Finally, for family 
arrangements I define the dummy variable that takes a value one when a child is reported as 
not living in the same household than the mother, and zero otherwise.     
The descriptive statistics for the household (mother) and children outcomes, as well 
as for other covariates in the analysis are presented in Table 3.  
                                                                          
24. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), measles is a leading cause of vaccine preventable childhood 
mortality. In developed countries, most children are immunized against measles by the age of 18 months. The 
vaccination is generally not given earlier than this because children younger than 18 months usually retain anti-measles 
(antibodies) transmitted from the mother during pregnancy. A second dose is usually given to children between the ages 
of four and five, in order to increase rates of immunity. Vaccination rates have been high enough to make measles 
relatively uncommon. In developing countries, however, measles remains common. 
25 The first dose of polio vaccine is given shortly after birth, usually between 1-2 months of age; a second dose is given 
at 4 months of age. The timing of the third dose depends on the vaccine formulation but should be given between 6–18 
months of age.  A booster vaccination is given at 4 to 6 years of age, for a total of four doses at or before school entry. 
26 For each child I compared the number of doses administered with the mode for each country and age group. In the 
case that the number of doses is lower than the mode by age and country, I define that a dose has not been 
administered. 
27 The information about vaccines is only available for a universe of children younger than 5 years old which in 
combination to the constraint of keeping just older siblings restricts the analysis to 20 and 10 percent of the samples 2+ 
and 3+, respectively. Moreover we have missing information about vaccines for approximately 50% of the sample. 
Therefore, the availability of information and the restriction in the unit of observation in order to ensure the exclusion 
restriction have a toll in the sample size to approximately 40 and 10 thousand children for the samples 2+ and  3+, 
respectively. Then, since the identification for the sample 3+ comes from approximately 30 observations with multiple 
births, I restrict the analysis of the impact of fertility on vaccine for the sample 2+ with approximately 360 births providing 
the source of variation in family size. 
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4 Results 
4.1 First Stage. Multiple births and number of children 
A (testable) necessary condition to ensure the validity of the instrument refers to the 
correlation between multiple births and family size so that an average difference in family size 
exists and can be measured properly. Specifically I estimate the following expression to check 
the relevance of the instrument,  
݊௜௖௧
௦ ൌ ߮௧௖௦ ൅ ߴ௔௦ ൅ ߬௘௦ ൅ ߪ௎௦ ൅ ߨ௦ܾ݉௜௖௧
௦ ൅ ߝ௜௖௧ǡ
௦     (E2) 
with ߨ௦ as the impact of multiple births in the ݏ birth for a woman ݅ who lives in 
country ܿ, who is observed at time t. The terms ߮௧௖௦ ǡ ߴ௔௦ǡ ߬௘௦ and ߪ௎௦ are fixed effects by 
country-year, mother’s age, mother’s education and urban status, respectively. The OLS 
estimates for ߨ௦ in equation (E 2), are presented in Table 4. Column 1 for the specification 
without other controls but country dummies, column 2 for the specification with all controls 
(equation E 2), and columns 3 to 5 for each of the three samples defined by the level of 
development of the country when using WBCC (2009). From the first two columns, we 
observe that the impact of multiple births is robust to the inclusion of other covariates in the 
model28. This finding is important since it reveals that at least based on these observed 
variables, multiple births are not strongly correlated with other covariates, and the positive 
impact that we observe on the number of surviving children is not driven by the correlation 
with the other covariates. Second, across all sub-samples, we observe a positive and 
statistically significant impact of multiple births (at a 1% significance level). Moreover, the 
“smallest” F-statistic is over 30, that is, higher than the most conservative critical value for the 
null hypothesis of weak instrument29. 
The magnitudes reported in Table 4 reveal for the complete sample (column 2) that 
the event of multiple births increases in approximately 0.3 the number of children for families 
that experience twining in a first birth and the magnitude goes up to 0.4 more children in the 
sample of families that experience multiple births in a third pregnancy. Notice too that as we 
divide the sample according the level of development, a higher impact of multiple births is 
observed among countries with higher level of income (“Upper Middle Income”), specifically 
when multiple births happen in a second or third birth (approximately 0.5 more children). This 
gradient in the impact of multiple births according the birth at which the twining happens and 
the level of development (income per capita) is not more than the combination of two facts. 
First, it is more likely that multiple births will increase family size as we get closer (or over) the 
“desire fertility” and second when families have smaller preferred family size as we observe in 
countries with higher levels of development (higher income per capita). Compared with 
previous studies that use the same source of identification, such as Angrist, Lavy, and 
Schlosser (2010), Caceres-Delpiano (2006), and Angrist and Evans (1998), I find estimates in 
line with what was reported in those studies, although the analysis is carried out for less 
developed countries. Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser (2010), for Israel, find an impact of multiple 
births that goes from 0.43 to 0.69 depending on the sample considered; Black, Devereux and 
Salvanes (2005), for Norway, find an impact that goes from 0.67 to 0.817. This similitude in 
                                                                          
28. The same robustness is observed for the sub-samples defined by WBCC. Nevertheless, in order to save space, they 
have not been included in the table. 
29. Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values for a specification with one endogenous variable and one excluded 
instrument for a 10%, 15%, 20% maximal IV size are 16.38, 8.96 and 6.66, respectively. 
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the estimated impact of multiple births, though using less developed countries, is explained 
by the differences in the period considered in each of these studies and the reported 
decrease of completed fertility even among less developed regions. The present analysis uses 
data for years later than 1990 (see Tavle 1), with the year 1972 as the median year of birth for 
the mothers considered in the analysis. In Angrist, Lavy and Schlosser (2010), the average 
birth cohort of the mothers for which the impact of multiple births on the number of children is 
estimated is 1942. Angrist and Evans (1998) use the US census for the year 1980 with 
mothers born between 1948 and 1960.  
4.1.1 GENERAL IMPACT 
Following Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007), I start first by drawing general conclusion about the 
impact of multiple births, and therefore the potential impact of an unexpected increase, based 
on its impact on summary index for each of the outcome groups. For each outcome group30, 
an index Z is defined to be the equally weighted average of z-scores31 of its components32.  
Then I estimate the following expression, 
ܼ ൌ ߩ௧௖௦ ൅ ߨ௔௦ ൅ ߠ௘௦ ൅ ߜ௎௦ ൅ ߙ௦ܾ݉௜௖௧
௦ ൅ ߝ௜௖௧ǡ
௦    (E3) 
with the p-values for the null of statistical insignificance of  ߙ௦ being reported from columns 1 
to 3 in Table 5. 
Secondly, in a similar context of seemingly unrelated equations I estimated the joint 
impact of multiple births on all outcomes in a group category and I test the joint significance 
of multiple births. The p-values for the null hypothesis of jointly insignificance are reported in 
columns 4 to 6 for each of the samples. 
Both approaches reported in Table 5 point into the same direction. That is, an 
increase in family size due to an event of multiple births has an impact on family 
arrangements, contraceptive behavior, and child’s education and health. Nevertheless, for 
adult’s outcomes, this impact comes for an increase in family size in the sample of families 
with three or more births. For children outcomes, an impact on the selected group of 
outcomes is observed in both samples but the conclusion depends on the approach used.  
4.2 Family Structure 
The estimated impacts of number of children on family arrangements are presented in Table 
6and Table 7. Table 6 presents OLS and 2SLS estimates for each of the three full samples 
(1+, 2+ and 3+). Table 7 presents the 2SLS estimates for the analysis of heterogeneity 
according the level of development. 
                                                                          
30. Children outcomes are divided in three groups: health, education and living arrangement. Health compasses 
variables on vaccination and the probability that a child is dead at the time of the survey. Education groups the variables 
about years of education, school enrollment and grade retention. Finally, living arrangement is defined just for the 
variable that capture if a child is living in the same household that the mother. For mothers, I keep the three groups of 
outcomes defined in the previous section: family arrangements, violence rationalization and contraceptive behavior.   
31. The z-score for each outcome is calculated by subtracting the mean for families without multiple births and dividing 
by the standard deviation of the same group.  
32. Family Arrangement: Non-traditional role - spouse at home - married + cohabitation; Violence: Justified Use of 
Violence (JUV) Household Neglect+ JUV Husband Mistreatment + JUV Refused Sex;  Contraceptive Behavior: Ever use 
of contraceptive + Sterilization + Days since last intercourse + Abstinence /Withdrawal; Health: Death+ Missing BCG+ 
Missing DPT + Missing Polio + Missing Measles; Education: Years of education + Attending School – Behind and; Living 
with the mother: living in the same household. 
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The first thing to notice is the fact that OLS results for the three samples (Table 6) in 
general support the simple descriptive statistic. That is, OLS estimates reveal that the number 
of children has a positive impact on marriage stability captured by an increase in the likelihood 
that the father is living at home, a reduction in the probability that a mother is not the spouse 
of the head of the household, and also an increase in the likelihood of living with a partner.   
When focusing on the 2SLS estimates, first, the usual loss of power associated with 
instrumental variables is noticeable; there are larger standard errors and fewer statistically 
significant estimates.  Despite this cost in power, important differences can still be learned 
from 2SLS. First, as we sought in the previous section, the impact of fertility concentrates in 
the samples 2+ and 3+ without a statistically significant impact on any of the outcomes for 
the sample of families that experience an unexpected increase in fertility in the first birth33. 
Second, as opposed to OLS estimates, we observe that an increase in family size is 
associated with unstable arrangements. Specifically, for the samples 2+ and 3+, a shock in 
the number of children increases the likelihood that a mother will have a role that I define as 
non-traditional such as the head of the household or other than the spouse of the household 
head. The magnitude goes from 5 to 8 percentage points for samples 2+ and 3+, which in 
terms of the sample means corresponds to a 17 and 31 percent, respectively. Moreover, for 
the sample 3+ 2SLS estimates also reveal that an increase in the number of children 
decreases the likelihood of being married by 3.4 percentage points and a decrease in the 
likelihood that the mother’s spouse (partner) lives in the same household by approximately 6 
percentage points. 
Finally, the analysis by level of development in Table 7reveals that a negative impact 
of family size on family arrangements is driven for those countries with lower levels of 
development, specifically for the sample of families with 3 or more births.   
4.3 Violence and Mother’s Contraceptive Behavior 
The estimated impact of the number of children on violence rationalization and contraception 
behavior outcomes are presented from Table 8 to Table 11. Table 8 and Table 9 present the 
OLS and 2SLS estimates for violence rationalization and contraceptive behavior, respectively. 
Table 10 and Table 11present the 2SLS estimates for the heterogeneity analysis by level of 
development for each of these group of outcomes. 
First, 2SLS and OLS results in Table 8 reveal (except for OLS estimates in sample 
1+) that an increase in the number of children does not have a significant impact on the 
likelihood that mothers accept violence.  
Second, for contraceptive behavior (Table 9) important differences are observed 
between OLS and 2SLS estimates. Though OLS estimates point out that an upward shift in 
family size increases the likelihood of having used contraceptives and decrease the frequency 
of intercourse (for sample 2+ and 3+), the results reveal as well that more children reduce the 
likelihood that a mother would undergo sterilization (samples 2+ and 3+) or they increase the 
frequency of intercourse for sample 1+. On the other hand, consistently as whole with 
Michael and Willis’s model, 2SLS not only reveal that an increase in fertility increases the 
likelihood of having used contraceptive, but also more children increase the time since last 
                                                                          
33. In a context of homogenous treatment, this finding is consistent with a non linear impact of fertility. In the more 
realistic setting of essential heterogeneity in the impact, this finding is also consistent with families with higher 
preferences for bigger family size who experience this unexpected change in fertility in a second or third birth as the one 
facing a higher cost associated to fertility. 
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intercourse and for the sample 2+, I estimate a positive and significant impact on the 
likelihood of using sterilization34.  Moreover, for all the statistically significant estimates, the 
pseudo Durbin-Wu-Hausman test reveals evidence of omitted variable bias when using OLS 
rather than 2SLS35.  
The heterogeneity analysis by level of development, Table 10 and Table 11, reveals 
some results that are missed when pooling the countries. First, we observe that an impact on 
the acceptance of violence is driven for those countries in the middle in the ranking of 
development. In fact, for some measures of violence rationalization in the sample of countries 
in the top of the distribution of development (upper middle income), an increase in family size 
reduces the likelihood of accepting violence. Second, an increase in the number of children 
increases the likelihood of having used contraceptives for countries in the bottom of the 
distribution of development, specifically for samples 2+ and 3+. For the sample 3+, in 
particular, we can observe that more children in the family increases not only in almost 2 
percent point the likelihood of sterilization for countries defined as low income but in average 
increase in three days the spacing between intercourses. Also for the sample 3+, but for the 
sample of countries defined as low middle income is observed an increase in the use of 
abstinence or withdrawal as contraceptive technology. Although for the countries in the upper 
tale of the GNI per capita is not found an increase in the likelihood of ever using 
contraceptive, a sizeable impact is observed on the likelihood of using sterilization. That is, an 
increase in the number of children increases in approximately 11 percentage points the 
likelihood of sterilization for the samples 2+ and 3+. This evidence of a sizeable increase in 
sterilization together with an insignificant and close to zero impact on the likelihood of ever 
using contraceptive suggest that the impact of increasing family size for countries defined as 
upper middle income comes as a substitution toward contraceptive technology with a lower 
marginal cost, such as sterilization, as it is implied for Michael and Willis’s model.  Finally, for 
countries in the lower or upper tale of development is find that family size increase the time 
between intercourses. 
4.4 Children Outcomes 
The results for children outcomes are presented in Table 12 and Table 13. Table 12 presents 
the impact of number of children on child’s vaccination36 and Table 13 the impact on the rest 
of the outcomes. Each of the tables present in the upper part (panel A) OLS and 2SLS 
estimates of the impact of the number of children. In the bottom of the table (panel B), is 
presented the heterogeneity analysis by country’s development.  
From Table 12 (Panel A), the first thing that we observe is that both OLS and 2SLS 
estimates reveal that an unexpected change in the number of children increases the likelihood 
of missing BCG or Measles vaccinations for children in the sample. Nevertheless, 2SLS point 
estimates are equal to or higher than OLS ones37. Specifically, an increase in the number of 
                                                                          
34. For samples 1+ and 3+ we also observe a positive impact on the likelihood of using sterilization as contraceptive 
method, nevertheless, the loss of precision when using multiple births as source of variation in family size does not allow 
us to pin down a statistically significant impact. 
35. In a framework with heterogeneity in the impact of family size the interpretation of the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test is 
not straightforward. OLS and 2SLS estimates would measure the impact of family size in different parts of the 
distribution (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2001). 
36. Note again that the analysis for child’s vaccination is focused just on the sample of families with two or more births. 
The reason lies in the fact that the information on vaccination is available just for children younger than five years old, 
which, added to the fact that we are keeping those children older than a specific birth (second for the sample 2+, and 
third for the sample 3+) as a unit of observation, it reduces the sample size for sample 3+ considerably 
37. However, the Hausman exogeneity test allows us to reject the null hypothesis just for the measles vaccination. 
However, we should be careful in the interpretation in a context of essential heterogeneity since the causal impact is no 
longer summarized in one parameter. 
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children produces an increase in the likelihood of missing the BCG by approximately 6 
percentage points, and approximately 7 percentage points for the case of the measles 
vaccine, which in terms of the sample means are impacts in the range of 50 to 30 percent, 
respectively.  Also in Table 12 (panel A), we observe that the results are robust to the 
inclusion of birth weight as measure of children endowment.  
The heterogeneity analysis by level of development in Table 12 (panel B) reveals that 
the findings for BCG and measles vaccines are driven by those countries defined as the ones 
with low income. Specifically, I find that an increase in the number of children is associated 
with an approximately 12 and 15 percentage points increase in the likelihood of missing BCG 
or measles, respectively. Therefore, the analysis of the impact of the number of children on 
vaccine use among children younger than 4 reveals that for the sample of countries with low 
income, there is a margin of the population for which family program policies have an 
important return. These countries are those at the earlier stage of development and 
characterized by high child mortality rates. At those stages of development, there is a high 
return in the reduction of child mortality by the prevention of infectious diseases (Soares, 
2007). 
The results for the rest of the outcomes in Table 13 reveal bigger differences 
between OLS and 2SLS estimates. On the one hand OLS estimates reveal a negative impact 
of fertility on educational achievements measured by years of education, grade retention, and 
the likelihood of attending school. On the other hand, contrary to a negative impact of fertility 
on child wellbeing, OLS estimates also show that an increase in the number of children 
reduces child mortality and the likelihood that a child is not living with her/his mother.   
Now when the endogeneity of fertility is addressed (2SLS estimates), not only a more 
consistent picture among outcomes but also supporting evidence of a negative impact of 
fertility is revealed. First, for the sample 3+ I find that an increase in the number of children has 
a sizeable impact on child mortality. Specifically an increase in the number of surviving 
children raises in 5 percentage points the likelihood that a child younger than seven is death. 
Second, there is a reduction of approximately 6.5 percentage points in the likelihood that a 
child attends school which in terms of the sample means is an approximately 10 percent 
reduction. Third, for both samples (2+ and 3+), we observe that more children in the family 
increase the likelihood that older children are not longer living with their mothers.   The 
magnitude of the estimates suggest that an additional child increases in approximately 4 to 3 
percentage points likelihood that a child is not longer living in the same household. In terms of 
the sample means the estimates define an impact of 15 and 10 percent for the samples 2+ 
and 3+, respectively. Finally, as well as we showed for child vaccination outcomes, the 
negative impact of fertility on children wellbeing comes from those countries classified as low 
income or lower middle income. For mortality though a 10 percentage points increase in the 
likelihood that a child is death is observed for the sample of countries with low income, for the 
sample of countries defined as lower middle income, a decrease in approximately 5 
percentage points is observed.   
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5 Conclusions 
The results of the paper reveal that there is a positive return of caring for family size in the 
context of developing countries. First, we observe that an increase in family size is associated 
with an increase in incidences of unstable family arrangements, measured by an increase in 
the likelihood that a mother holding a non-traditional role (being the head of the household or 
not the spouse of the household head), a decrease in the likelihood of being married and a 
decrease in the likelihood that the mother’s spouse (partner) lives in the same household. For 
outcomes directly associated with mothers’ wellbeing, I find that more children raises the time 
between intercourses, increases the use of contraceptives, and for some samples, an 
increase in the odds of sterilization. For children’s outcomes, the findings reveal that more 
children in a family decrease the likelihood of a completed vaccination schedule, they also 
increase the odds of child mortality, reduce the probability of attending school and we 
observe a reduction in the likelihood of living in the same household than their mother. The 
analysis by level of development of the countries reveals an important degree of 
heterogeneity. The impact on outcomes measuring family arrangements and children 
wellbeing are driven for countries with a lower level of income. Finally, the impact on 
contraceptive behavior shows a different type of heterogeneity.  At all levels of development, 
mothers change their contraceptive behavior. Nevertheless, at higher levels of development, 
the use of contraceptive alternatives such as sterilization is preferred, while in regions with a 
lower level of development, the alternatives used are spacing of intercourse, abstinence and 
withdrawal. 
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
Figure 1 
Evolution of the fraction of Twin birth over the total births by year of birth. 
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Table 1 
Countries and Years Considered in the Analysis 
Country Sample  WB Classification (2009) Country Sample  WB Classification (2009) 
1 Peru 1996 2000 Upper Middle Income 23 Philippines 1998 2003 Lower Middle Income 
2 Guatemala 1995 1998 Lower Middle Income 24 Rwanda 2000 2005 Low Income 
3 Colombia 1995 2000 2005 Upper Middle Income 25 Senegal 2005 Lower Middle Income 
4 Bolivia 1994 1998 2003 Lower Middle Income 26 Tanzania 1996 1999 Low Income 
5 Nicaragua 1998 2001 Lower Middle Income 27 Togo 1998 Low Income 
6 Dominican Rep. 1996 1999 2002 Upper Middle Income 28 Zambia 1996 2002 Low Income 
7 Brazil 1996 Upper Middle Income 29 Zimbabwe 1994 1999 Low Income 
8 Haiti 2000 2005 Low Income 30 Burkina Faso 1999 2003 Low Income 
9 Honduras 2005 Lower Middle Income 31 Benin 
1996 2001 
2006 Low Income 
10 Bangladesh 1994 1997 2000 Low Income 32 Comoros 1996 Low Income 
11 Cameroon 1998 2004 Lower Middle Income 33 South Africa 1998 Upper Middle Income 
12 Car 1995 Low Income 34 Chad 1997 2004 Low Income 
13 Ivory Coast 1994 1999 Lower Middle Income 35 Congo 2005 Low Income 
14 Ghana 1998 2003 Low Income 36 Mozambique 1997 2003 Low Income 
15 Indonesia 1994 1997 2003 Lower Middle Income 37 Cambodia 2000 2005 Low Income 
16 Kenya 1998 2003 Low Income 38 Ethiopia 2000 2005 Low Income 
17 Madagascar 1997 2004 Low Income 39 Gabon 2000 Upper Middle Income 
18 Malawi 2000 2004 Low Income 40 Guinea 1999 2005 Low Income 
19 Mali 1996 2001 2006 Low Income 41 Lesotho 2004 Lower Middle Income 
20 Namibia 2000 Upper Middle Income 42 Swaziland 2006 Lower Middle Income 
21 Niger 1998 2006 Low Income 43 India 1999 2006 Lower Middle Income 
22 Nigeria 1999 2003 Lower Middle Income         
The World Bank Classification of countries is based on 2009 GNI per capita. The groups are “low income,” $995 or less; “lower 
middle income,” $996-$3,945; “upper middle income,” $3,946-$12,195 and; “high income,” $12,196 or more.
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Table 2 
Frequency of Multiple Births. Complete Sample of 
Children
Type of Birth Frequency Percentage 
Singletons 1,388,916 97.94 
Twins 28,662 2.02 
Triplets 480 0.03 
Total 1,418,058 100 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics. 
1+ 2+ 3+ 
No Household Head Spouse          0.359 0.291 0.245 
Spouse at Home                    0.729 0.774 0.801 
Married                           0.729 0.764 0.777 
Married or Living with Someone    0.145 0.143 0.143 
Justified Use of Violence (JUV)   0.449 0.462 0.481 
JUV: Household Neglect            0.369 0.38 0.395 
JUV: Husband Mistreatment         0.366 0.377 0.395 
JUV: Refuse Sex                   0.207 0.218 0.237 
Ever Contraceptive                0.781 0.783 0.765 
Female Sterilization              0.118 0.152 0.154 
Days since Last Intercourse       13.517 13.059 13.139 
                                  [12.592] [12.431] [12.456] 
Abstinence/Withdrawal              0.072 0.071 0.068 
Non BCG Vaccination      0.132 
Non DPT  Vaccination    0.309 
Non Polio Vaccination  0.306 
Non Measles Vaccination  0.228 
Death                   0.127 0.153 
Child’s Years of Education      2.625 2.559 
                        [2.461] [2.454] 
Grade Retention         0.12 0.128 
Attend School           0.647 0.665 
Child does not live in the same HH   0.262 0.303 
Male Children 0.509 0.504 
Child's Age 8.799 9.932 
[4.528] [4.233] 
Mother's Age                      28.444 29.554 30.384 
                                  [5.927]  [5.569]  [5.224]  
Mother's Years of Education       5.16 4.667 3.951 
                                  [4.685]  [4.533]  [4.223]  
Proportion in Urban area          0.393 0.366 0.326 
Low Income                        0.373 0.397 0.454 
Lower Middle Income               0.462 0.455 0.42 
Number of Children                2.441 2.896 3.404 
                                  [1.446]  [1.355]  [1.372]  
Standard deviation in parentheses. The standard deviation for proportion is not shown. 
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Table 4 
Impact of Multiple Births on Woman's Number of Children 
Unconditional Conditional Low Income Lower Middle Income Upper Middle Income 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
1+ 0.2322*** 0.3125*** 0.2468*** 0.3257*** 0.4430*** 
[0.029] [0.025] [0.036] [0.039] [0.058] 
F 63.49 162.2 47.17 70.65 34.63 
Obs. 514173 190810 237388 85975 
2+ 0.4569*** 0.4041*** 0.3616*** 0.3728*** 0.6116*** 
[0.027] [0.025] [0.036] [0.040] [0.056] 
F 279.99 266.38 101.94 88.22 119.74 
Obs. 394214 154761 179110 60343 
3+ 0.6059*** 0.4437*** 0.3905*** 0.4957*** 0.5046*** 
[0.030] [0.028] [0.036] [0.051] [0.086] 
F 395.39 255.75 117.95 95.58 57.36 
Obs.   264434 118121 110878 35435 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** 
significant at 1 percent. Covariates are dummy variables for mother’s age, mother’s education, urban 
status, and country-year interaction. 1+, 2+, and 3+ stand for the samples of families with one, two, and 
three or more births, respectively. Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values for 10%, 15%, 20% maximal 
IV size are16.38, 8.96 and 6.66, respectively.
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Table 5 
Overall Intent-to-Treat. Impact of Multiple Births on Selected Outcome Groups. P-values 
KLK Joint Estimation 
A) Adults 1+ 2+ 3+ 1+ 2+ 3+ 
Family Arrangements 0.564 0.031 0.000 0.579 0.122 0.002 
Rationalization of Violence 0.295 0.206 0.814 0.755 0.429 0.657 
Contraceptive Behavior 0.008 0.012 0.000 0.181 0.021 0.000 
B) Children 
Health 0.024 0.764 0.2719 0.065 
Education 0.74 0.017 0.618 0.0345 
Living in the Same Household   0.044 0.106   0.0441 0.0797 
1+, 2+. 3+ stand for the samples with one, two, and three or more births, respectively. 
Following Kling, Liebman and Katz (KLK) (2007), columns 1 to 3 present the p-value for the dummy of multiple births in an 
equation that has as dependent variable an index for each of the outcome groups listed in the first column. Each index is 
defined to be the equally weighted average of z-scoresof its components (the outcome minus the mean of that variable for the 
families without multiple births over the standard deviation of the variable for families without multiple births). Specifically, 
Family Arrangement: non-traditional role - spouse at home - married + cohabitation; Violence: Justified Use of Violence 
(JUV) Household Neglect+ JUV Husband Mistreatment + JUV Refused Sex;  Contraceptive Behavior: Ever use of 
contraceptive + Sterilization + Days since last intercourse + Abstinence /Withdrawal; Health: Death+ Missing BCG+ Missing 
DPT + Missing Polio + Missing Measles; Education: Years of education + Attending School – Behind and; Living with the 
mother: living in the same household. Columns 4 to 6 report the p-values of the null joint insignificance of multiple births for
the joint estimation of multiple births on all the outcomes in specific category and sample. 
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Table 6 
OLS and 2SLS Estimates of the Impact of Fertility on Different Measures of 
Family Structure
No 
Household 
Head 
Spouse 
Spouse at 
Home Married 
Living with 
Someone 
1+ 2SLS 0.0249 -0.0361 0.0034 -0.01 
[0.031] [0.028] [0.025] [0.020] 
OLS -0.0471*** 0.0527*** 0.0433*** 0.0062*** 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
p-value 0.0172 0.0008 0.1042 0.417 
Observations 514173 
2+ 2SLS 0.0502** -0.0223 -0.0189 0.0186 
[0.023] [0.018] [0.017] [0.014] 
OLS -0.0282*** 0.0336*** 0.0278*** 0.0039*** 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
p-value 0.0004 0.0021 0.004 0.3037 
Observations 394214 
3+ 2SLS 0.0788*** -0.0589*** -0.0336* 0.0166 
[0.022] [0.020] [0.017] [0.014] 
OLS -0.0191*** 0.0250*** 0.0212*** 0.0026*** 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.309 
   Observations 264434 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** 
significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Covariates are dummy 
variables for mother’s age, mother’s education, urban status, country-year 
interaction. 1+, 2+, and 3+ stand for the samples of families with one, two, 
and three or more births, respectively.
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Table 7 
2SLS Estimates of the Impact of Fertility on Measures of Family Structure by the World Bank 
Country Classification. 
No
Household 
Head Spouse 
Spouse at 
Home Married
Living 
with 
Someone 
1+ Low Income Countries 0.0183 -0.0305 0.0062 -0.0096 
[0.055] [0.053] [0.047] [0.037] 
Lower Middle Income Countries 0.0362 -0.0386 0.006 -0.0313 
[0.047] [0.038] [0.033] [0.021] 
Upper Middle Income Countries 0.0032 -0.055 0.0023 0.0098 
[0.058] [0.057] [0.053] [0.054] 
2+ Low Income Countries 0.0995*** -0.0485 -0.0376 0.0232 
[0.038] [0.030] [0.027] [0.022] 
Lower Middle Income Countries -0.0151 0.0131 0.027 -0.0046 
[0.040] [0.029] [0.024] [0.017] 
Upper Middle Income Countries 0.0209 -0.0136 -0.0475 0.0473 
[0.042] [0.037] [0.038] [0.039] 
3+ Low Income Countries 0.0630** -0.0633** -0.0542** 0.0416** 
[0.031] [0.030] [0.026] [0.019] 
Lower Middle Income Countries 0.0903** -0.0497* -0.0146 -0.0054 
[0.036] [0.029] [0.024] [0.018] 
Upper Middle Income Countries 0.0814 -0.0631 0.0117 -0.0308 
    [0.062] [0.059] [0.069] [0.065] 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** 
significant at 1 percent. Covariates are dummy variables for mother’s age, mother’s education, 
urban status, country-year interaction. 1+, 2+, and 3+ stand for the samples of families with one, 
two, and three or more births, respectively. The World Bank Country Classification defines the 
economies according the 2009 GNI per capita. The groups are “low income,” $995 or less; 
“lower middle income,” $996-$3,945; “upper middle income,” $3,946-$12,195 and; “high 
income,” $12,196 or more.
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Table 8 

OLS and 2SLS Estimates of the Impact of Fertility on Different Measures of Violence 
Rationalization.
Justified Use 
of Violence 
Justified Use 
of Violence: 
Household 
Neglect 
Justified Use 
of Violence: 
Husband 
Mistreatment 
Justified Use 
of Violence: 
Refuse Sex 
1+ IV 0.0609 0.0366 0.0323 0.0183 
[0.037] [0.036] [0.035] [0.032] 
OLS 0.0028*** 0.0002 0.0023** 0.0001 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
p-value 0.1138 0.3099 0.395 0.5747 
Observations 249016 
2+ IV 0.0381 0.0166 0.0424 0.0335 
[0.031] [0.032] [0.031] [0.027] 
OLS 0.0015 -0.0012 0.0012 -0.0007 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
p-value 0.2323 0.5731 0.1849 0.2133 
Observations 193187 
3+ IV 0.0065 0.0038 0.0088 -0.0275 
[0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.029] 
OLS 0.0011 -0.0006 0.0007 -0.0004 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
p-value 0.8732 0.8953 0.8098 0.3408 
  Observations 131626 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 
percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Covariates are dummy variables for mother’s age, 
mother’s education, urban status, country-year interaction. 1+, 2+, and 3+ stand for the 
samples of families with one, two, and three or more births, respectively.
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Table 9 
OLS and 2SLS Estimates of the Impact of Fertility on Contraceptive Behavior.
Ever Using 
Contraceptive 
Female 
Sterilization 
Days since 
Last
Intercourse 
Abstinence/Withdrawal 
1+ IV 0.0178 0.0181 1.4203* 0.0162 
[ 0.0258] [0.018] [0.815] [0.016] 
OLS 0.0503*** 0.0025*** -0.0628*** 0.0019*** 
[0.001] [0.000] [0.022] [0.000] 
p-value 0.2069 0.3758 0.0618 0.3774 
Observations 514173 514173 445616 514173 
2+ IV 0.0504*** 0.0315** -0.038 0.0096 
[0.018] [0.015] [0.595] [0.012] 
OLS 0.0370*** -0.0105*** 0.2001*** 0.0008** 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.024] [0.000] 
p-value 0.4571 0.0038 0.6882 0.4687 
Observations 394214 394214 340937 394214 
3+ IV 0.0404** 0.0142 2.3494*** 0.0097 
[0.020] [0.014] [0.614] [0.013] 
OLS 0.0327*** -0.0174*** 0.3571*** 0.0011** 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.028] [0.000] 
p-value 0.7028 0.0264 0.001 0.4929 
  Observations 264434 264434 231120 264434 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 
1 percent. Covariates are dummy variables for mother’s age, mother’s education, urban status, country-year 
interaction. 1+, 2+, and 3+ stand for the samples of families with one, two, and three or more births, 
respectively
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Table 10 
2SLS Estimates of the Impact of Fertility on Different Measures of Violence Rationalization by the World 
Bank Country Classification.
Justified Use 
of Violence 
Justified Use 
of Violence: 
Household 
Neglect 
Justified Use 
of Violence: 
Husband 
Mistreatment 
Justified Use 
of Violence: 
Refuse Sex 
1+ Low Income Countries 0.0097 -0.0183 -0.0279 0.0026 
[0.058] [0.056] [0.055] [0.056] 
Lower Middle Income Countries 0.1215** 0.0967* 0.0955* 0.0349 
[0.053] [0.052] [0.052] [0.039] 
Upper Middle Income Countries -0.0456 -0.0211 0.0282 0.0234 
[0.074] [0.071] [0.055] [0.033] 
2+ Low Income Countries -0.006 -0.0318 -0.0035 0.0077 
[0.039] [0.041] [0.040] [0.038] 
Lower Middle Income Countries 0.1367** 0.1170* 0.1494** 0.0907* 
[0.066] [0.067] [0.067] [0.050] 
Upper Middle Income Countries -0.0351 -0.0334 -0.0510* -0.0143 
[0.058] [0.057] [0.030] [0.010] 
3+ Low Income Countries 0.0079 0.0224 0.021 -0.0426 
[0.047] [0.048] [0.048] [0.042] 
Lower Middle Income Countries -0.0078 -0.0383 -0.0113 -0.0044 
[0.052] [0.051] [0.051] [0.041] 
Upper Middle Income Countries 0.0884 0.1195 -0.0197 -0.0277 
    [0.161] [0.173] [0.082] [0.031] 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 
1 percent. Covariates are dummy variables for mother’s age, mother’s education, urban status, country-year 
interaction. 1+, 2+, and 3+ stand for the samples of families with one, two, and three or more births, 
respectively. The World Bank Country Classification defines the economies according the 2009 GNI per 
capita. The groups are “low income,” $995 or less; “lower middle income,” $996-$3,945; “upper 
middle income,” $3,946-$12,195 and; “high income,” $12,196 or more.
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Table 11 
2SLS Estimates of the Impact of Fertility on Contraceptive Behavior by the World Bank Country 
Classification.
Ever Using 
Contraceptive 
Female 
Sterilization 
Days since 
Last
Intercourse 
Abstinence/ 
Withdrawal 
1+ Low Income Countries 0.0208 0.0172 1.1364 0.0378 
[0.052] [0.015] [1.539] [0.028] 
Lower Middle Income 
Countries 0.0306 0.0213 2.8556** 0.0236 
[0.038] [0.034] [1.253] [0.026] 
Upper Middle Income 
Countries -0.0129 0.0246 -0.2549 -0.0369 
[0.037] [0.045] [1.397] [0.034] 
2+ Low Income Countries 0.0616** 0.0009 0.0678 0.0173 
[0.031] [0.007] [0.955] [0.017] 
Lower Middle Income 
Countries 0.0758** 0.0296 -0.7006 0.0173 
[0.031] [0.035] [1.064] [0.025] 
Upper Middle Income 
Countries -0.0005 0.1122*** 0.5256 -0.0112 
[0.023] [0.038] [1.052] [0.023] 
3+ Low Income Countries 0.0558* 0.0190* 3.0533*** -0.0112 
[0.032] [0.010] [0.937] [0.016] 
Lower Middle Income 
Countries 0.0251 -0.0089 1.1614 0.0412* 
[0.031] [0.031] [0.931] [0.023] 
Upper Middle Income 
Countries 0.04 0.1190** 3.2314* 0.0041 
    [0.029] [0.058] [1.749] [0.045] 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant 
at 1 percent. Covariates are dummy variables for mother’s age, mother’s education, urban status, country-year 
interaction. 1+, 2+, and 3+ stand for the samples of families with one, two, and three or more births, 
respectively. The World Bank Country Classification defines the economies according the 2009 GNI per 
capita. The groups are “low income,” $995 or less; “lower middle income,” $996-$3,945; “upper 
middle income,” $3,946-$12,195 and; “high income,” $12,196 or more.
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Table 12 
OLS and 2SLS Estimates of the Impact of Fertility on Child Vaccination. Children younger 
than 5 years old. 
Non  Non  Non Non  
BCG DPT  Polio Measles 
A IV 
Without Birth weight 0.0668** 0.043 0.0482 0.0730* 
[0.032] [0.038] [0.042] [0.038] 
With Birth Weight 0.0796** 0.0622 0.0571 0.0889**
[0.033] [0.039] [0.043] [0.038] 
OLS Estimates 0.0106** 0.0016 0.0055 0.007 
[0.004] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] 
p-value pseudo Hausman Endogeneity test 0.0786 0.2719 0.3076 0.0758 
Observations 47666 49123 39848 46973 
B
Low Income Countries 0.1212** 0.0291 0.0547 0.1484**
[0.059] [0.059] [0.069] [0.066] 
Lower Middle Income Countries 0.0227 0.0124 -0.0158 -0.0247 
[0.051] [0.071] [0.072] [0.065] 
Upper Middle Income Countries -0.0072 0.0904 0.0816 0.0162 
    [0.028] [0.061] [0.064] [0.051] 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; 
*** significant at 1 percent. Covariates are dummy variables for mother’s age, mother’s 
education, urban status, country-year interaction, child’s age (in months) and child’s gender. 
1+, 2+, and 3+ stand for the samples of families with one, two, and three or more births, 
respectively. For the sample 3+ since the two oldest children are included, a dummy for birth 
order is used as covariate. 
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Table 13 
2SLS Estimates of the Impact of Fertility on Child Vaccination by the World Bank Country Classification. 
Death Children Education 
Grade
Retention 
Attend 
School 
Child is 
not at 
Home 
A 2+ 
IV -0.0044 -0.0255 -0.0176 -0.0219 0.0435** 
[0.019] [0.106] [0.020] [0.023] [0.022] 
OLS -0.1895*** -0.2100*** 0.0147*** -0.0107*** -0.0566***
[0.002] [0.006] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
p-value pseudo Hausman Endogeneity test 0.00 0.08 0.11 0.63 0.00 
Observations 162896 112184 205539 108779 391705 
3+ 
IV 0.0507** -0.1143 -0.0166 -0.0652*** 0.0322* 
[0.022] [0.103] [0.014] [0.024] [0.017] 
OLS -0.1783*** -0.1844*** 0.0129*** -0.0085*** -0.0725***
[0.001] [0.005] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
p-value pseudo Hausman Endogeneity test 0.00 0.50 0.03 0.02 0.00 
Observations 78066 79525 145438 72627 260383 
            
2+ 
B Low Income Countries -0.0306 -0.1488 0.0098 -0.0408 0.0151 
[0.031] [0.153] [0.022] [0.038] [0.037] 
Lower Middle Income Countries 0.0326 0.1306 -0.0552 -0.0225 0.0918** 
[0.037] [0.184] [0.050] [0.042] [0.039] 
Upper Middle Income Countries -0.0003 -0.0547 -0.0129 0.0208 0.0244 
[0.020] [0.129] [0.036] [0.030] [0.033] 
3+ 
Low Income Countries 0.1095*** -0.1785 -0.0184 -0.0541 0.0689** 
[0.039] [0.126] [0.014] [0.037] [0.029] 
Lower Middle Income Countries -0.0420* -0.0774 -0.0175 -0.0736** -0.0155 
[0.023] [0.167] [0.027] [0.035] [0.022] 
Upper Middle Income Countries 0.054 -0.3141 0.013 -0.0792 0.0273 
    [0.061] [0.364] [0.051] [0.055] [0.041] 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. 
Covariates are dummy variables for mother’s age, mother’s education, urban status, country-year interaction, child’s age (in 
months) and child’s gender. 1+, 2+, and 3+ stand for the samples of families with one, two, and three or more births, 
respectively. For the sample 3+ since the two oldest children are included, a dummy for birth order is used as covariate. The 
World Bank Country Classification defines the economies according the 2009 GNI per capita. The groups are “low 
income,” $995 or less; “lower middle income,” $996-$3,945; “upper middle income,” $3,946-$12,195 and; “high 
income,” $12,196 or more.
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Appendix 
Robustness to Child Endowment  
A) Colombia, Rwanda and Uganda. Disability Status as measure of Child 
      Endowment 
One of the concerns raised by Rosenzweig and Zhang (2006) refers to the possibility that 
parents might allocate resources to compensate (or reinforce) an endowment shock, which 
along with a likely impact on health outcomes for children belonging to multiple births, might 
jeopardize the validity of multiple births as an instrument. This concern about the orthogonality 
of multiple births is addressed by checking the robustness of the findings to the inclusion of a 
measure of children’s “health” endowment. In particular, the following model is estimated, 
ݕ௜
௦ ൌ ߙ௦ ൅ ߛ௦ܥ௜
௦ ൅ σ ߚ௩ܦ௩௦௩ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௜
௦  (B2) 
with a superscript, ݏ, referring to the sample of  mothers with ݏ or more births and ܦ௩a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one when a child is observed in the ݒ birth with a 
disability and zero otherwise as the proxy for child’s endowment. Thus, for the sample of 
mothers with one or more children, a dummy variable is included for the disability status in the 
first birth; for the sample of mothers with two or more children, two dummies are included, 
one for the disability status of the first birth, and one for the second and so on for the samples 
3+. 
DHS data, however, cannot be used to estimate equation (2) since the disability 
status (or another measure of endowment) is not available for all children. Therefore in order 
to provide a sensitivity analysis, I make use of a secondary data sample from the Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), which provides census data information for some 
developing countries. The data are samples from population censuses from around the world 
taken since 1960. The variables have been given consistent codes and have been 
documented to enable cross-national and cross-temporal comparisons. From a total of 111 
country-year censuses, only three country-years are considered: Colombia (2005), Rwanda 
(2002), and Uganda (2002). Unlike the rest of the samples, for these countries and years I am, 
first, able to construct the instrument (multiple births), because I have the month of birth. 
Second, I have information about some outcomes similar to the one presented for the 
analysis with the DHS data. Third, for these samples, mothers are not only asked about the 
number of children at home but also about the number of children, which is our variable of 
interest. Finally, I not only have information about the disability status of the members of the 
household but I am also able to define the origin of the disability for these country-year 
samples. Specifically, I am able to sort out birth defects from other disabilities. The 
importance of this distinction resides in the fact that this latter group of disabilities can be 
confused with other factors affecting directly the outcomes. By using only those disabilities 
considered to be birth defects, it is less likely that an additional bias will be introduced in the 
estimation. 
The sample is restricted in the same way as with the DHS data.  First I keep only 
individuals living in households as group quarters. Second, I consider mothers who are 
between 18 and 45 years old, and who had their first birth between 15 and 35 years of age. 
Nevertheless, unlike the DHS data I have only the information on children living at home in 
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order to construct the information on multiple births. Thus, in order to minimize the error in the 
instrument, first, I restrict the attention to those families where the number of children living at 
home matches the reported number of children ever born. Also, differently from the DHS 
data, due to the fact that we only observe children living at home, I restrict the analysis to 
families whose oldest child is younger than 738. 
A final limitation of census data is related to the limited number of outcomes 
compared to DHS data. Specifically, I am able to define just two groups of variables.  The first 
group of variables as with the DHS data, helps us to measure the impact of family size on 
family arrangements. In a second group of variables, I analyze the impact of family size on the 
children outcomes. 
For the variables describing family arrangements, four dummy variables are 
constructed: “Married” takes a value of one if a mother is married and zero otherwise; 
“Mother’s spouse at home” takes a value of one when a member of the household is linked to 
the mother as a spouse, and zero otherwise; “No Father” takes a value when at least one of 
the children of a mother does not report a father, and zero otherwise; finally, “Grandparents” 
takes a value of one if a mother reports living with at least one of her parents, and zero 
otherwise39. 
For the second group of outcomes, four variables are defined. The first variable, 
“Years of Education,” corresponds to years of education for those children considered in the 
universe of the question40. The second variable, “Grade Retention,” is a dummy variable that 
takes a value of one for those children with a number of years of education below the mode 
by country and age, and zero otherwise. The third outcome, “Child Work,” is a dummy 
variable taking the value of one if a child is employed41, and zero otherwise. Finally, the 
variable, “Child School,” is also a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a child is 
attending school, and zero otherwise42.  
Table B1 presents the results for the robustness check on the inclusion of children’s 
birth disability dummies. The first column for each of the samples presents the specification 
without the birth disability status for the children in the household. The second column 
presents the specification when including birth disability status in the specification. The first 
finding is the robustness and stability of the estimated coefficient when we include the birth 
disability variables. Although, this finding is not a formal “proof” of the orthogonality of multiple 
birth, the strong stability of the estimates reduces the concern that the event of multiple births 
is capturing the effect of other unobserved variables. Second, the results for family 
arrangements present mixed results. While for sample 1+ is found that number of children 
increases the likelihood that a mothers reports being married (sample 3+), family size has a 
positive effect on the probability that a child reports no father at home and a decrease in the 
likelihood that a child reports the father to be living in the household. Finally, the outcome for 
                                                                          
38. Figure 1 graphically presents the share of mothers whose number of surviving children matches the number of 
children ever born. By restricting the sample to mothers with an oldest child younger than 7, I ensure a more 
representative sample with almost 80% of the mothers included in the analysis. Nevertheless, this fraction varies 
considerably across countries. For Colombia, almost 90% fulfill this restriction. However, this fraction is just 63% for 
Rwanda.  
39. Parents of a potential spouse are not used since they are only available when a spouse is present at the time of the 
census and, therefore, conditional to a specific family arrangement. 
40. For Colombia, the universe corresponds to all children 3 years old or older; for Rwanda, 6 years of age or older; for 
Uganda, 5 years of age or older.  
41. The employment status is defined by all individuals older than five years old. 
42. The universe is the same as the one for the variables “Years of Education” and “Behind.” 
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children reveals that an increase in family size is in fact associated with an increase in the level 
of wellbeing of children measured by an increase in the level of education and by a reduction 
in the likelihood of grade retention measured for the variable behind in sample 1+, and by a 
reduction in the likelihood that a child would work for sample 3+. 
As I did for the DHS analysis, Table B2 divides the sample across country region. For 
the outcomes related to family arrangements, I find that, consistent with the findings using 
DHS data, there is a negative impact on family stability among the sample of mothers in these 
two African countries. Specifically for this sample, we observe that an increase in family size 
not only increases the likelihood that a mother stays on her own, measured by a decrease in 
the likelihood that a mother is married, a decrease in the probability that her spouse is at 
home and that one of her children reports the father in the household, but also that a mother 
would use the help of other relatives, measured here by an increase in the likelihood that she 
is living with her parents. On the other hand, for Colombia, with the exception of the likelihood 
that a child would report no father for sample 3+, and specifically for sample 1+, the 
estimates reveal that an increase in family size is associated with an increase in the likelihood 
that a mother would live under a more stable family arrangement. For children outcomes, 
nevertheless, we do not find evidence of heterogeneity across these two country regions. In 
fact, for both country regions, it is still observed that an increase in family size has a negative 
impact on the likelihood that a child would repeat a grade, that is, she/he would be classified 
as “behind,” and for the two African countries, a negative impact on the likelihood that that 
child is working is also estimated.  
This positive impact on children, nevertheless, might be driven for the restriction of 
the sample to consider just mothers that experience a shift in family size when the oldest child 
is “too young” (younger than eight years old) to work and mothers who might want to stay in 
the labor market would opt for an early enrollment of the children in the formal education 
system. In order to explore this hypothesis, I repeat the analysis but using families with the 
oldest child younger than 14 years old instead. Nevertheless, since we restricted the sample 
to families with the number of surviving children equal to the number of children ever born, I 
end up with a more selected sample. Figure 1 presents the share of families, for each of the 
countries in the analysis, whose number of surviving children matches the number of children 
ever born. We observe that this last restriction to ensure the quality of the instrument, 
combined with restriction on the age of the oldest child, leaves us with an extremely selected 
sample for Rwanda and Uganda when setting the age of the oldest child younger than 14 
years of age. Therefore, I restrict this last analysis to Colombia since I am still able to consider 
more than 80% of the mothers in the analysis. The results are presented in Table B3. 
Although a positive impact on years of education is still found for sample 2+, the estimates for 
sample 3+ reveal, first, that an increase in family size produces an increase in the likelihood 
that a child suffered from grade retention. Second, when dividing the sample according to 
birth order for sample 3+, we find that a negative on human capital accumulation is driven by 
the oldest child in the family. Specifically, for the oldest child, we observe a reduction in more 
than a quarter of a year of education and an increase of approximately 8 percentage points. 
B)  DHS Data. Birth Weight as Measure of Child’s Endowment 
 
The information about birth weight is available just for the sample of children younger than five 
years old in DHS data. Given this restriction I must center the robustness check on families 
with the oldest child been younger than five (since we need birth weight for all children in the 
household). Moreover, the distribution of missing values is not random (even among families 
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with children younger than five). Those observations with missing information for birth weight 
are more likely to be older mothers, more likely living in rural areas, and living in countries with 
lower level of income per capita. 
Then instead of just constraining to non-missing, I estimate the following expression: 
ݕ௜
௦ ൌ ߙ௦ ൅ ߛ௦ܥ௜
௦ ൅෍ߚ௩ͳሼܤܹ݊݋ݐ݉݅ݏݏ݅݊݃ሽܤܹ௩
௦
௩ୀଵ
൅ ߝ௜
௦ 
With ܤܹ௩ as the birth weight for the child born in a v-th birth and 1{*} is a logic 
statement taking a value one when “*” is true, and zero otherwise. The estimates of gamma 
are presented in the following two tables. 
The results of the analysis are presented in Table B4 and Table B5. First, by 
restricting the sample to families with the oldest child younger than five years old it is 
noticeable the loss of power with few of the estimates being statistically significant. 
Nevertheless, comparing the estimates without (unconditional) and those conditional on birth 
weight, we observe that are practically the same. Therefore, this analysis together with the 
robustness check done including birth disability when using census data for Colombia, 
Rwanda and Uganda, reduce our concern that the findings are driven by the reallocation of 
resources due to an endowments shock. 
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Figure B1: Fraction of Mothers with a Number of Surviving Children equal 
to the Number of Children Ever born by Age of her Oldest Child. 
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Table B1. Robustness Check to the Inclusion of Birth Disability Dummies. 2SLS estimates of the Impact of Fertility on Selected 
Outcomes.{Sample Means}
1+ 2+ 3+ 
Mother Married {0.77} 0.0249* 0.0250* {0.85} -0.0107 -0.0107 {0.89} -0.0298 -0.03 
[0.014] [0.014] [0.017] [0.017] [0.025] [0.025] 
Mother Spouse at Home {0.69} 0.0176 0.0177 {0.78} -0.0044 -0.0044 {0.82} -0.0566* -0.0575* 
[0.016] [0.016] [0.022] [0.022] [0.033] [0.033] 
Child reports No father {0.29} -0.0178 -0.0179 {0.21} 0.009 0.0089 {0.17} 0.0530* 0.0535* 
[0.015] [0.015] [0.021] [0.021] [0.031] [0.031] 
Grandparents at Home {0.16} 0.0114 0.0114 {0.09} -0.0026 -0.0022 {0.06} 0.0252 0.0248 
[0.014] [0.014] [0.016] [0.016] [0.025] [0.025] 
Years of Education {2.87} 0.0690** 0.0693** {2.39} -0.0092 -0.0052 
[0.034] [0.034] [0.038] [0.037] 
Behind {0.27} -0.0296** -0.0295** {0.31} 0.0191 0.0166 
[0.013] [0.013] [0.019] [0.019] 
Attend School {0.84} -0.0023 -0.003 {0.81} -0.0313 -0.0283 
[0.029] [0.029] [0.038] [0.038] 
Child Labor {0.02} 0.0071 0.0075 {0.03} -0.0227*** -0.0223*** 
          [0.010] [0.010]   [0.004] [0.004] 
Birth Disability     X     X     X 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Other 
covariates in the model, additionally to birth disability dummies, are dummy variables by country of residence, urban status, 
mother’s educational attainments and squared polynomials in mother's age and age of the oldest child in the family. 1+, 2+, and 3+ 
stand for the samples of families with one, two, and three or more births, respectively. 
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Table B2. Robustness Check to the Inclusion of Birth Disability Dummies. 2SLS estimates of the Impact of 
Fertility on Selected Outcomes by Country Region. 
Colombia Uganda & Rwanda 
1+ 2+ 3+ 1+ 2+ 3+ 
Mother Married 0.0586*** 0.004 -0.0959 -0.0368*** -0.0316 0.01 
[0.019] [0.026] [0.061] [0.014] [0.021] [0.018] 
Mother Spouse at Home 0.0621*** 0.0148 -0.098 -0.0628*** -0.0322 -0.0329 
[0.021] [0.032] [0.072] [0.017] [0.027] [0.032] 
Child reports No father -0.0520** -0.0029 0.1274* 0.0420*** 0.027 0.0085 
[0.021] [0.031] [0.071] [0.016] [0.025] [0.029] 
Grandparents at Home -0.0006 -0.0287 0.0681 0.0333*** 0.0336** -0.0009 
[0.020] [0.024] [0.062] [0.011] [0.017] [0.014] 
Years of Education 0.067 -0.0061 0.0599 -0.0107 
[0.043] [0.055] [0.049] [0.045] 
Behind -0.0228* 0.0202 -0.0681** 0.0057 
[0.013] [0.023] [0.030] [0.030] 
Attend School -0.0086 -0.041 0.0157 -0.0059 
[0.036] [0.057] [0.043] [0.044] 
Child Labor 0.0065 -0.0097 0.0078 -0.0332*** 
    [0.008] [0.008] [0.024] [0.004] 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 
percent. Covariates in the model are dummy variables for birth disability, dummy variables for country of residence 
(when proceed), urban status, mother’s educational attainments and squared polynomials in mother's age and age of 
the oldest child in the family. 1+, 2+, and 3+ stand for the samples of families with one, two, and three or more 
births, respectively. 
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Table B3. 2SLS estimates of the Impact of Fertility on Selected Outcomes 
for Colombia. Mothers whose Oldest Child is younger than 14 years old. 
2+ 3+ 
All 1st Child 2nd Child 
Years of Education 0.0991* -0.1016 -0.2861*** 0.1075 
[0.058] [0.106] [0.109] [0.141] 
Behind -0.0329 0.0718** 0.0875** 0.0561 
[0.023] [0.030] [0.042] [0.041] 
Attend School -0.0114 -0.0099 -0.0222 0.0075 
[0.014] [0.023] [0.033] [0.031] 
Child Labor 0.0008 -0.0004 0.0009 -0.0027 
  [0.004] [0.005] [0.008] [0.006] 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** 
significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Covariates in the model 
are dummy variables for birth disability, dummy variables for country of 
residence (when proceed), urban status, mother’s educational attainments 
and squared polynomials in mother's age and age of the oldest child in the 
family. 1+, 2+, and 3+ stand for the samples of families with one, two, and 
three or more births, respectively. 
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Table B4. Sensitivity Analysis. Robustness Check to the Inclusion of Birth Weight. Children Outcomes 
Non BCG 
Vaccination 
Non DPT 
Vaccination 
Non Polio 
Vaccination 
Non Measles 
Vaccination Death 
Child is not 
at Home 
2+ 
Conditional on 
Birth Weight 0.0769** 0.0577 0.0553 0.0853** -0.0002 0.0201 
[0.032] [0.038] [0.043] [0.038] [0.024] [0.029] 
Unconditional 0.0668** 0.043 0.0482 0.0730* -0.0035 0.0175 
[0.032] [0.038] [0.042] [0.038] [0.024] [0.029] 
47666 49123 39848 46973 81242 81242 
3+ 
Conditional on 
Birth Weight -0.0183 0.0135 -0.0186 0.0264 0.0415 0.0665** 
[0.033] [0.041] [0.041] [0.038] [0.028] [0.032] 
Unconditional -0.0207 0.0113 -0.0177 0.0235 0.041 0.0661** 
[0.033] [0.040] [0.040] [0.038] [0.027] [0.032] 
    50372 53449 41811 49626 88382 88382 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 
percent. Covariates are dummy variables for mother’s age, mother’s education, urban status, country-year 
interaction, child’s age (in months) and child’s gender. 1+, 2+, and 3+ stand for the samples of families with one, 
two, and three or more births, respectively. For the sample 3+ since the two oldest children are included, a 
dummy for birth order is used as covariate.
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Table B5. Sensitivity Analysis. Robustness Check to the Inclusion of Birth Weight. Mother’s Outcomes
No 
Household 
Head 
Spouse 
Spouse 
at
Home Married
Married 
or
Living
with 
Someone
Ever
Contraceptive
Female 
Sterilization 
Days since 
Last
Intercourse Abstinence
Conditional on Birth 
Weight 0.1161* -0.0416 -0.0467 0.0453 0.0094 0.0117 2.8818 -0.0142 
[0.068] [0.057] [0.047] [0.041] [0.053] [0.034] [2.049] [0.022] 
Unconditional 0.1171* -0.0432 -0.0475 0.0438 0.009 0.0221 3.0136 -0.0187 
[0.066] [0.055] [0.046] [0.039] [0.051] [0.032] [1.966] [0.021] 
28729 28729 28729 28729 28729 28729 26571 28729 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. 
Covariates are dummy variables for mother’s age, mother’s education, urban status, and country-year interaction. 1+, 2+, and 3+
stand for the samples of families with one, two, and three or more births, respectively.
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